dalam harakahdaily....diadakan survey....apa yang perlu dibuat dengan baki helikopter Nuri yang masih ada dalam simpanan.

Hasil survey yang dibuat....ramai mencadangkan supaya helikopter nuri itu digunakan sebagai helikopter rasmi pemimpin2 kerajaan. .

Bagus jugak...nanti banyaklah kawasan2 parlimen dan dewan undangan negeri (DUN) yang kosong dan perlu diadakan pilihanraya....maju sikit tempat tersebut macam Ijok dulu....sekarang Ijok dah moden.

Survey Harakahdaily tentang Nuri

Hmm, agak-agaknyalah, kalau kerajaan lain dipilih, beranikah pemimpin baru kerajaan naik Nuri?

p/s: lawak juga perlu bertempat. Haru ana membaca survey sebegini diadakan di laman web alternatif.
lainlah kalau dilaman web satira kreatif!

dah betul apa yang berlaku sekarang ini...itulah realiti.....kenderaan pemimpin2 semua hebat2 dan baru...tapi untuk tentera, dibiarkan guna yang lama2....so...lawak ke realiti ke sama sahaja....sepatutnya gaji dan elaun pemimpin2 dihadkan, dikurangkan....dikumpulkan duit2 itu semua beli model yang baru.

Kenapa pulak "kalau kerajaan lain"??.....Kenapa ramai umat Islam malaysia ini asyik tak mahu dan tak berani sentuh kerajaan sedia ada???...adakah kerana dah sign "Aku Janji" sebelum terima scholarship hari itu??...atau kerana dah terpedaya, dibrainwash waktu hadiri BTN???

Nuri boleh guna sebagai logistik JPA ke, SMART ke..
Nuri ni serbeboleh walaupun tua...

jadikan besi buruk dekat gurun mojave tu.biarlah nuri berehat pula bagi yang lain buat kerja.

Pada 25-03-08 22:38 , Rashdin posting:
tak pun...hantar kat syarikat perfileman transformer tu.

suruh dia buat jadi macam yang kumpulan jahat tu.

gempak woo.....


*maaf ye. sekadar selingan.

bilalah malaysia boleh pakai helicopter2 moden macam kat bawah ini???.....check singapore military profile then compare dengan malaysia military....rasa macam takut pulak....jauh berbeza....singapore siap ada apache.

NH90 NHIndustries

Eurocopter EC-725 Cougar

AgustaWestland EH101

Eurocopter Tiger

US101 AgustaWestland

AW109 AgustaWestland

AW139 AgustaWestland

bila Barisan Rakyat ambik alih pentadbiran malaysia ini...insyaAllah....dengan ketiadaan rasuah, salahguna kuasa, middleman commission (kronilah ini)....malaysia mampu memiliki helicopter2 seperti kat atas ini.


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http://al-ahkam.net/home/index.php

http://www.alwahy.com/

Pada 25-03-08 23:19 , mohamad posting:


boleh saja.tapi kena tunggu robot scan dulu lah.nak letak dia kat site mana?baik?jahat?



p/s----->rasanya robot pun tak berkenan


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

Pada 26-03-08 03:36 , naruto-san posting:

hmmm..amerika cuma jual apache kepada negara-negara sekutu dia saja...sebagai contoh sngpura...Malaysia memang takkan dapat beli apache...

Pada 26-03-08 19:32 , umarzahrawi posting:




kita buatlah melalui pindahan teknologi


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

tak perlu Apache, tak hebat pun....

hmm...tu kira jadi tggjwab engineer2 ATM lepas ni untuk buat pindahan teknologi...kita pun ada ramai engineer2 tntra yang hbat2..:di:di

Pada 26-03-08 20:46 , Daeng_Jati posting:


tak hebat?cuba tengok track record dia.ia amat mengagumkan.dan ia diikuti dengan satu lagi helikopter iaitu kiowa warrior yang mana masing-masing dah terbukti kebolehan dimedan perang.pasal kena tembak tu biasalah di medan perang.



rasanya baik beli apache dan kiowa warrior


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

mari sini AH-64 Singapura tu datang sini...

Pada 26-03-08 20:53 , Daeng_Jati posting:



boleh saja.tapi daeng nak buat apa?nak pandu ke? nanti ajak saya juga hehehehe


p/s------>heli dalam cerita transformers tu pun ok juga.siap boleh jadi robot begitu.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

Pada 26-03-08 19:32 , umarzahrawi posting:

biaselah itu....negara2 pengguna apache adalah egpyt (36 buah), greece (32 buah), israel (49 buah), japan (55), kuwait (16), netherlands (29), saudi arabia (12), singapore (20), UAE (30), britain (67), USA (700) ---- sumber wikipedia.

tapi....malaysia mempunyai alternative selain apache....Barisan Rakyat bila dah mentadbir malaysia boleh consider untuk beli eurocopter tiger untuk TUDM ....lagipun eurocopter tiger ini lagi baru dari apache...setakat ini hanya negara australia, spain, france, germany & saudi arabia sahaja yang ada tiger ini.








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http://al-ahkam.net/home/index.php

http://www.alwahy.com/

hmm,tak nak ke beli kiowa warrior?.nampak kecil tapi kompak dan lincah hehehe

Pada 26-03-08 22:00 , Rashdin posting:

OH-58D Kiowa Warrior

boleh nak beli....tapi kiowa warrior ini helicopter lama....produce tahun 60an....lagipun dibuat oleh company USA...entah mereka nak jual ke tidak kepada malaysia.

cukuplah malaysia beli barang lama (2nd hand) seperti Nuri - Sikorsky SH-3 Sea King....dah tibe masanye malaysia consider beli barang2 baru


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http://al-ahkam.net/home/index.php

http://www.alwahy.com/

btol3!!!..tak payah beli yang 2nd hand lagi...2nd hand pun bukan marah pstu nak kena buat mntenance lagi...mbzir saja..baik beli yang baru saja...

Pada 26-03-08 22:14 , naruto-san posting:


ya ke?rasanya dah dibina semula tapi menggunakan bahan2 yang baru dan peralatan pun baru.hmmm


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

okeylah...rasanya malaysia perlu consider beli kiowa warrior (make sure baru, bukan 2nd hand) & eurocopter tiger untuk TUDM.

oleh kerana tahap keselamatan nuri yang sangat diragui ni...apakata kalau TUDM jadikan nuri ni sebagai drone kepada pesawat pejuang dan latihan TUDM...baru best... boleh buat latihan menembak guna AMRAAM ke...gatling gun ke...shoot sehingga 'drone' dimusnahkan....sama macam konsep yang AS buat dalam melatih juruterbang fighter pilot mereka...

Pada 26-03-08 22:55 , sayatetapsaya posting:


semua tu boleh kalau tak ada rasuah.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

kalau tak ada rasuah..mesti da banyak aircraft yang kita ada..

Pada 26-03-08 23:13 , umarzahrawi posting:


betul tu.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

kalau kita tengok semua teknologi ketenteraan, semestinya US berade ditangge teratas. kenapa? sebab deme saja yang selalu terlibat dalam pentempuran. biasa lah siapa tak kenai US. amat terkenai kat negare2 yang dijajahnye yang kelengkapan ketenteraannye yang tak ok. jadi semua missin Accomplised dengan successful. tak ada tentangan yang setaraf. cuba deme bertemu buku dan ruas, baru kita tau kekuatan sebnor US. US teragak2 dari dulu nak serang Iran. dah bertahun kata nak serang, nak serang, sampei sekarang tak serang2.....

Pada 27-03-08 06:37 , Daeng_Jati posting:



bukan tu sebabnya.sebabnya mereka ada rancangan tersusun dan terkoordinasi



p/s------>teringat balik masa perang 6 hari,israel dengan senang mengayamkan semua negara arab yang serang dia.hmm suatu keajaiban tu.mungkin agaknya


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

selagi tak bertemu buku dengan ruas, teman takkan percaya apa-apa...
memang teman akui yang rancangan semua teratur dan berjaya...

moh kita singkap Perang 6 hari yang Israel menang besor tu....

The Six-Day War (Arabic: حرب الأيام الستة‎, Ḥarb al‑Ayyam as‑Sitta or more commonly Arabic: حرب 1967‎, Ḥarb 1967; Hebrew: מלחמת ששת הימים‎, Milhemet Sheshet Ha‑Yamim), also known as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Third Arab-Israeli War, Six Days' War, an‑Naksah (The Setback), or the June War, was fought between Israel and Arab neighbors Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The nations of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria also contributed troops and arms to the Arab forces.

In May 1967, Egypt expelled the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Sinai Peninsula, which had been stationed there since 1957 (following the 1956 Sinai invasion to allow for a free Suez Canal), to provide a peace-keeping buffer zone. In reaction to Israeli-Syrian tensions, Egypt amassed 1000 tanks and 100,000 soldiers on the border, closed the Straits of Tiran to all ships flying Israeli flags or carrying strategic materials, and called for unified Arab action against Israel.In response, on June 5, 1967, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack against Egypt's airforce. Jordan, which had signed a mutual defence treaty with Egypt on May 30, then attacked western Jerusalem and Netanya.At the war's end, Israel had gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The results of the war affect the geopolitics of the region to this day.



Background

Suez Crisis Aftermath

The Suez Crisis of 1956 represented for Egypt a military defeat but a political victory. It was a pivotal event in the lead up to the Six Day War. Heavy diplomatic pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union forced Israel to withdraw its military from the Sinai Peninsula..

After the 1956 war, Egypt agreed to the stationing of a UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai, the United Nations Emergency Force, to keep that border region demilitarized, and prevent Palestinian fedayeen guerrillas from crossing the border into Israel.

Egypt also agreed to reopen the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, whose closure had been a significant catalyst in precipitating the Suez Crisis. As a result, the border between Egypt and Israel remained quiet for a while.

After the 1956 war the region returned to an uneasy balance without the resolution of any of the issues plaguing the region. At the time, no Arab state had recognized Israel. Syria, aligned with the Soviet bloc, began sponsoring guerrilla raids on Israel in the early 1960s as part of its "people's war of liberation", designed to deflect domestic opposition to the Ba'ath Party.

Israel's National Water Carrier

In 1964, the Israelis began withdrawing water from the Jordan River for its National Water Carrier. The following year, the Arab states began construction of the Headwater Diversion Plan, which, once completed, would divert the waters of the Banias Stream before the water entered Israel and the Sea of Galilee, to flow instead into a dam at Mukhaiba for use by Jordan and Syria, and divert the waters of the Hasbani into the Litani River, in Lebanon. The diversion works would have reduced the installed capacity of Israel's carrier by about 35%, and Israel's overall water supply by about 11%.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) attacked the diversion works in Syria in March, May, and August of 1965, perpetuating a prolonged chain of border violence that linked directly to the events leading to war.

Israel and Jordan

    Main article: Samu Incident

On 12 November 1966 an Israeli border patrol hit a mine, killing three soldiers and injuring six others. The Israelis believed the mine had been planted by militants from Es Samu on the West Bank. Early on the morning 13 November, King of Jordan Hussein bin Talal, who had been having secret meetings with Abba Eban and Golda Meir for three years concerning peace and secure borders, received an unsolicited message from his Israeli contacts stating that Israel had no intention of attacking Jordan. However, at 5:30 a.m. in what Hussein described as an action carried out "under the pretext of 'reprisals against the terrorist activities of the (Palestine Liberation Organization) P.L.O.' Israeli forces attacked Es Samu, a village in the Jordanian-occupied West Bank of 4,000 inhabitants, all of them Palestinian refugees whom the Israelis accused of harboring terrorists from Syria".

In "Operation Shredder", Israel's largest military operation since 1956, a force of around 3,000-4,000 soldiers backed by tanks and aircraft divided into a reserve force, which remained on the Israeli side of the border, and two raiding parties, which crossed into the Jordanian-occupied West Bank. The larger force of eight Centurion tanks followed by 400 paratroopers mounted in 40 open-topped half-tracks and 60 engineers in 10 more half-tracks headed for Samu, while a smaller force of 3 tanks and 100 paratroopers and engineers in 10 half-tracks headed towards two smaller villages, Kirbet El-Markas and Kirbet Jimba. Conflicting reports of this incident have been made. According to Terrence Prittie's Eshkol: The Man and the Nation 50 houses were blown up but the inhabitants had been evacuated hours before. The 48th Infantry Battalion of the Jordanian army, commanded by Major Asad Ghanma, ran into the Israeli forces north-west of Samu and two companies approaching from the north-east were intercepted by the Israelis, while a platoon of Jordanians armed with two 106 mm recoilless guns entered Samu. In the ensuing battles three Jordanian civilians and fifteen soldiers were killed; fifty-four other soldiers and ninety-six civilians were wounded. The commander of the Israeli paratroop battalion, Colonel Yoav Shaham, was killed and ten other Israeli soldiers were wounded. According to the Israeli Government, fifty Jordanians were killed but the true number was never disclosed by the Jordanians in order to keep up morale and confidence in King Hussein's regime.

Two days later, in a memo to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, his Special Assistant Walt Rostow wrote "retaliation is not the point in this case. This 3000-man raid with tanks and planes was out of all proportion to the provocation and was aimed at the wrong target" and went on to describe the damage done to US and Israeli interests: "They've wrecked a good system of tacit cooperation between Hussein and the Israelis... They've undercut Hussein. We've spent $500 million to shore him up as a stabilizing factor on Israel's longest border and vis-Ã -vis Syria and Iraq. Israel's attack increases the pressure on him to counterattack not only from the more radical Arab governments and from the Palestinians in Jordan but also from the Army, which is his main source of support and may now press for a chance to recoup its Sunday losses... They've set back progress toward a long term accommodation with the Arabs... They may have persuaded the Syrians that Israel didn't dare attack Soviet-protected Syria but could attack US-backed Jordan with impunity."

Facing a storm of criticism from Jordanians, Palestinians, and his Arab neighbors for failing to protect Samu, Hussein ordered a nation-wide mobilization on 20 November.

Israel and Syria

In addition to sponsoring attacks against Israel (often through Jordanian territory, much to King Hussein's chagrin), Syria also began shelling Israeli civilian communities in north-eastern Galilee from positions on the Golan Heights, as part of the dispute over control of the Demilitarized Zones (DMZs), small parcels of land claimed by both Israel and Syria.

Syria charged that Israel was constantly harassing Arab farmers in the Demilitarized Zone and opening fire on Syrian military positions, while Israeli armoured tractors were cultivating Arab land in the Demilitarized Zone, backed by Israel armed forces illegally placed there. Syria informed the Security Council that the grave deterioration along the demarcation lines was the result of the dual Israel aim to increase tension so as to justify subsequent large-scale aggression against Syria and to expand its illegal occupation of the Demilitarized Zone by liquidating the rights of Arab cultivators. Syria stated that in every instance where there was a Syrian firing, it was in return of provocative Israel fire directed against peaceful Arab farmers or Syrian posts. Nine years later, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli defense minister at the time of the war, stated a version of events very similar to this one:

    After all, I know how at least 80 percent of the clashes there started. In my opinion, more than 80 percent, but let's talk about 80 percent. It went this way: We would send a tractor to plow some area where it wasn't possible to do anything, in the demilitarized area, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn't shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance farther, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the air force also, and that's how it was.

In 1966, Egypt and Syria signed a defence pact whereby each country would support the other if it were attacked. According to Indar Jit Rikhye, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad told him that the Soviet Union had persuaded Egypt to enter the pact with two ideas in mind: to reduce the chances of a punitive attack on Syria by Israel and to bring the Syrians under Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's moderating influence.
Report to the Foreign Office from the British Embassy in Damascus on the clash between Israel and Syria on 7 April 1967 over cultivation of disputed land
Report to the Foreign Office from the British Embassy in Damascus on the clash between Israel and Syria on 7 April 1967 over cultivation of disputed land

During a visit to London in February 1967, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban briefed journalists on Israel's "hopes and anxieties" explaining to those present that although the governments of Lebanon, Jordan and the United Arab Republic (Egypt's official name until 1971) seemed to have decided against active confrontation with Israel it remained to be seen whether Syria could maintain a minimal level of restraint at which hostility was confined to rhetoric.

On April 7, 1967, a minor border incident escalated into a full-scale aerial battle over the Golan Heights, resulting in the loss of six Syrian MiG-21s to Israeli Air Force (IAF) Dassault Mirage III, and the latter's flight over Damascus. Tanks, heavy mortars, and artillery were used in various sections along the 47 mile (76 km) border in what was described as "a dispute over cultivation rights in the demilitarized zone south-east of Lake Tiberias." Earlier in the week, Syria had twice attacked an Israeli tractor working in the area and when it returned on the morning of 7 April the Syrians opened fire again. The Israelis responded by sending in armour-plated tractors to continue ploughing, resulting in further exchanges of fire. Israeli aircraft dive-bombed Syrian positions with 250 and 500 kg bombs. The Syrians responded by shelling Israeli border settlements heavily and Israeli jets retaliated by bombing the village of Sqoufiye destroying around 40 houses. At 15:19 Syrian shells started falling on Kibbutz Gadot; over 300 landed within the kibbutz compound in 40 minutes. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) attempted to arrange a ceasefire, but Syria declined to co-operate unless Israeli agricultural work was halted.

Speaking to a Mapai party meeting in Jerusalem on 11 May Prime Minister of Israel Levi Eshkol warned that Israel would not hesitate to use air power on the scale of 7 April in response to continued border terrorism and on the same day Israeli envoy Gideon Rafael presented a letter to the president of the Security Council warning that Israel would "act in self-defense as circumstances warrant". Writing from Tel Aviv on 12 May, James Feron reported that some Israeli leaders had decided to use force against Syria "of considerable strength but of short duration and limited in area" and quoted "one qualified observer" who "said it was highly unlikely that Egypt (the officially called United Arab Republic), Syria's closest ally in the Arab world, would enter the hostilities unless the Israeli attack were extensive". In early May the Israeli cabinet authorized a limited strike against Syria, but Rabin's renewed demand for a large-scale strike to discredit or topple the Ba'ath regime was opposed by Eshkol. Bowen reports:

    The toughest threat was reported by the news agency United Press International (UPI) on 12 May: 'A high Israeli source said today that Israel would take limited military action designed to topple the Damascus army regime if Syrian terrorists continue sabotage raids inside Israel. Military observers said such an offensive would fall short of all-out war but would be mounted to deliver a telling blow against the Syrian government.' In the West as well as the Arab world the immediate assumption was that the unnamed source was Rabin and that he was serious. In fact, it was Brigadier-General Aharon Yariv, the head of military intelligence, and the story was overwritten. Yariv mentioned 'an all-out invasion of Syria and conquest of Damascus' but only as the most extreme of a range of possibilities. But the damage had been done. Tension was so high that most people, and not just the Arabs, assumed that something much bigger than usual was being planned against Syria.

Border incidents multiplied and numerous Arab leaders, both political and military, called for an end to Israeli reprisals. Egypt, then already trying to seize a central position in the Arab world under Nasser, accompanied these declarations with plans to re-militarize the Sinai. Syria shared these views, although it didn't prepare for an immediate invasion. The Soviet Union actively backed the military needs of the Arab states. It was later revealed that on 13 May a Soviet intelligence report given by Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny to Egyptian Vice President Anwar Sadat claimed falsely that Israeli troops were massing along the Syrian border. In May 1967, Hafez al-Assad, then Syria's Defense Minister declared: "Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian Army, with its finger on the trigger, is united... I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation."

Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force

At 10:00 p.m. on 16 May, the commander of UNEF, General Indar Jit Rikhye, was handed a letter from General Mohammed Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic, reading: "To your information, I gave my instructions to all U.A.. armed forces to be ready for action against Israel, the moment it might carry out any aggressive action against any Arab country. Due to these instructions our troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our eastern border. For the sake of complete security of all U.dan. troops which install OPs along our borders, I request that you issue your orders to withdraw all these troops immediately." Rikhye said he would report to the Secretary-General for instructions.

The UN Secretary-General U Thant attempted to negotiate with the Egyptian government, but on May 18 the Egyptian Foreign Minister informed nations with troops in UNEF that the UNEF mission in Egypt and the Gaza Strip had been terminated and that they must leave immediately, and Egyptian forces prevented UNEF troops from entering their posts. The Governments of India and Yugoslavia decided to withdraw their troops from UNEF, regardless of the decision of U Thant. While this was taking place, U Thant suggested that UNEF be redeployed to the Israeli side of the border, but Israel refused, arguing that UNEF contingents from countries hostile to Israel would be more likely to impede an Israeli response to Egyptian aggression than to stop that aggression in the first place. The Permanent Representative of Egypt then informed U Thant that the Egyptian government had decided to terminate UNEF's presence in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and requested steps that the force withdraw as soon as possible. On May 19 the UNEF commander was given the order to withdraw. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser then began the re-militarization of the Sinai, and concentrated tanks and troops on the border with Israel.

The Straits of Tiran

On May 22, Egypt announced that the Straits of Tiran would be closed to "all ships flying Israel flags or carrying strategic materials", with effect from May 23. The Arab Republic of Egypt established the breadth of its territorial sea at 12 nautical miles, pursuant to article 5 of the Ordinance of 18 January 1951 as amended by the Decree of 17 February 1958, in line with the provisions of article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Whereas article 23 of the Convention stipulates that the ships in question shall, when exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by international agreements, the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt declared that it would require the aforementioned ships to obtain authorization before entering the territorial sea of Egypt, until such international agreements are concluded and Egypt becomes a party to them.

The position of the Government of the United Arab Republic was that the Tiran Strait, 13 miles wide, was its territorial waters in which it had a right to control shipping. It was argued that Egypt whose territorial sea covered the Strait of Tiran was entitled by virtue of this very fact to require foreign ships to obtain its consent before seeking access to the gulf. Nasser stated, "Under no circumstances can we permit the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba." Most of Israel's commerce used Mediterranean ports, and, according to John Quigley, no Israeli-flag vessel had used the port of Eilat for the two years preceding June 1967. There were ambiguities, however, about how rigorous the blockade would be, particularly whether it would apply to non-Israeli flag vessels. Citing international law Israel considered the closure of the straits to be illegal, and it had stated it would consider such a blockade a casus belli in 1957 when it withdrew from the Sinai and Gaza. Egypt and others considered that the action of Israel was not legitimate self-defence within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter because no armed attack on its territory had in fact occurred. Egypt stated that the Gulf of Aqaba had always been a national inland waterway subject to the sovereignty of the only three legitimate littoral States — Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt — who had the right to bar enemy vessels. Israel's claim to have a port on the Gulf was considered invalid, as Israel was alleged to have occupied several miles of coastline on the Gulfline, including Umm Rashrash, in violation of Security Council resolutions of 1948 and the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement.

The Arab states disputed Israel's right of passage through the Straits, noting that they had not signed the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone specifically because of article 16(4) which provided Israel with that right. However, it has long been a part of state practice and customary international law that ships of all states have a right of innocent passage through territorial seas. That Egypt had consistently granted passage as a matter of state practice until then suggests that its opinio juris in that regard was consistent with practice. Furthermore, when Egypt occupied the Saudi islands of Sanafir and Tiran in 1950, it provided assurances to the US that the military occupation would not be used to prevent free passage, and that Egypt recognizes that such free passage is "in conformity with the international practice and the recognized principles of international law.". In 1949 the International Court of Justice held in the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) that where a strait was overlapped by a territorial sea foreign ships, including warships, had unsuspendable right of innocent passage through such straits used for international navigation between parts of the high seas, but express provision for innocent passage through straits within the territorial sea of a foreign state was not codified until the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. In the UN General Assembly debates immediately after the war, the Arab League argued that even if international law gave Israel the right of passage, Israel was not entitled to attack Egypt to assert it because the closure was not an "armed attack" as defined by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Pursuant to this point, international law professor John Quigley argues that under the doctrine of proportionality, Israel would only be entitled to use such force as would be necessary to secure its right of passage. This is however, contentious, as international law bodies such as the International Criminal Court as well as the International Law Commission have held the contrary as a matter of general principle. The ICC has sought to include blockading as an act of war in its statutes, as traditionally understood, while the ILC has stated that a blockade may be construed as an "armed attack" as defined in Art. 51 of the UN Charter.

Gamal Abdel Nasser declared to the Egyptian parliament: "The problem before the Arab countries is not whether the port of Eilat should be blockaded or how to blockade it - but how to totally exterminate the State of Israel for all time".

Israel viewed the closure of the straits with some alarm and the U.S. and UK were asked to open the Straits of Tiran, as they guaranteed they would in 1957. Harold Wilson's proposal of an international maritime force to quell the crisis was adopted by President Johnson, but received little support, with only Britain and the Netherlands offering to contribute ships.

Egypt and Jordan
May 30, 1967. Hussein of Jordan and Nasser of Egypt sign a defense treaty
May 30, 1967. Hussein of Jordan and Nasser of Egypt sign a defense treaty

During May and June the Israeli government had worked hard to keep Jordan out of any war; it was concerned about being attacked on multiple fronts, and did not want to have to deal with the Palestinian population of the West Bank. However, Jordan's King Hussein got caught up in the wave of pan-Arab nationalism preceding the war; and so, on May 30, Jordan signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt, thereby joining the military alliance already in place between Egypt and Syria. President Nasser, who had called King Hussein an "imperialist lackey" just days earlier, declared: "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight."

At the end of May 1967, Jordanian forces were given to the command of an Egyptian General Abdul Munim Riad. On the same day, Nasser proclaimed: "The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel ... to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not of more declarations." Israel called upon Jordan numerous times to refrain from hostilities. According to Mutawi, Hussein was caught on the horns of a galling dilemma: allow Jordan to be dragged into war and face the brunt of the Israeli response, or remain neutral and risk full-scale insurrection among his own people. Army Commander-in-Chief General Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker warned in a press conference that "If Jordan does not join the war a civil war will erupt in Jordan". However, according to Avi Shlaim, Hussein's actions were prompted by his feelings of Arab nationalism.

On June 3, days before the war, Egypt flew to Amman two battalions of commandos tasked with infiltrating Israel's borders and engaging in attacks and bombings so as to draw IDF into a Jordanian front and ease the pressure on the Egyptians. Soviet-made artillery and Egyptian military supplies and crews were also flown to Jordan.
Nasser, backed by Arab states, kicks Israel into the Gulf of Aqaba. Pre-1967 War cartoon. Al-Jarida newspaper, Lebanon.
Nasser, backed by Arab states, kicks Israel into the Gulf of Aqaba. Pre-1967 War cartoon. Al-Jarida newspaper, Lebanon.

Israel's own sense of concern regarding Jordan's future role originated in Jordanian control of the West Bank. This put Arab forces just 17 kilometers from Israel's coast, a jump-off point from which a well coordinated tank assault would likely cut Israel in two within half an hour. Hussein had doubled the size of Jordan's army in the last decade and had US training and arms delivered as recently as early 1967, and it was feared that it could be used by other Arab states as staging grounds for operations against Israel; thus, attack from the West Bank was always viewed by the Israeli leadership as a threat to Israel's existence. At the same time several other Arab states not bordering Israel, including Iraq, Sudan, Kuwait and Algeria, began mobilizing their armed forces.

The drift to war

In his speech to Arab trade unionists on May 26, Nasser announced: "If Israel embarks on an aggression against Syria or Egypt, the battle against Israel will be a general one and not confined to one spot on the Syrian or Egyptian borders. The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel."

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban wrote in his autobiography that he found "Nasser's assurance that he did not plan an armed attack" convincing, adding that "Nasser did not want war; he wanted victory without war". Writing from Egypt on 4 June 1967 New York Times journalist James Reston observed: "Cairo does not want war and it is certainly not ready for war. But it has already accepted the possibility, even the likelihood, of war, as if it had lost control of the situation."

Writing in 2002 American National Public Radio journalist Mike Shuster expressed a view that was prevalent in Israel before the war that the country "was surrounded by Arab states dedicated to its eradication. Egypt was ruled by Gamal Abdel Nasser, a firebrand nationalist whose army was the strongest in the Arab Middle East. Syria was governed by the radical Baathist Party, constantly issuing threats to push Israel into the sea." With what Israel saw as provocative acts by Nasser, including the blockade of the Straits and the mobilization of forces in the Sinai, creating military and economic pressure, and the United States temporizing because of its entanglement in the Vietnam War, Israel's political and military elite came to feel that preemption was not merely militarily preferable, but transformative.

Diplomacy and intelligence assessments

The Israeli cabinet met on 23 May and decided to launch an attack if the Straits of Tiran were not re-opened by 25 May. Following an approach from US Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow to allow time for the negotiation of a nonviolent solution Israel agreed to a delay of ten days to two weeks. UN Secretary General, U Thant, visited Cairo for mediation and recommended moratorium in the Straits of Tiran and a renewed diplomatic effort to solve the crisis. Egypt agreed and Israel rejected these proposals. Nasser's concessions do not necessarily suggest that he was making a concerted effort to avoid war. The decision benefited him both politically and strategically. Agreeing to diplomacy helped garner international political support. Moreover every delay gave Egypt time to complete its own military preparations and coordinate with the other Arabs forces. Also, Israel's rejection does not necessarily demonstrate a desire for war so much as it demonstrates the urgency they felt their situation warranted. Israel felt it could not afford to sustain total mobilization for long.

The U.S. also tried to mediate and Nasser agreed to send his vice-president to Washington to explore a diplomatic settlement. The meeting did not happen because Israel launched its offensive. Some analysts suggest that Nasser took actions aimed at reaping political gains, which he knew carried a high risk of precipitating military hostilities. Nasser's willingness to take such risks was based on his fundamental underestimation of Israel's capacity for independent and effective military action.
Freshly informed by CIA assessments contradicting a supposed pessimistic Israeli estimate of Arab military capabilities, Johnson, in the presence of Secretary McNamara and other senior officials, hears out Abba Eban on 26 May 1967
Freshly informed by CIA assessments contradicting a supposed pessimistic Israeli estimate of Arab military capabilities, Johnson, in the presence of Secretary McNamara and other senior officials, hears out Abba Eban on 26 May 1967

Egyptian Field Marshall `Abdel Hakim `Amer had devised a plan to launch an attack on Israel with the aim of cutting off Eilat at dawn on May 27. On 26 May 1967, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban landed in Washington with the goal of ascertaining from the American administration its position in the event of the outbreak of war. As soon as Eban arrived, he was handed a cable from the Israeli government. The cable said that Israel had learned of an Egyptian and Syrian plan to launch a war of annihilation against Israel within the next 48 hours. Eban met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and finally with President Johnson. The Americans said their intelligence sources could not corroborate the claim; the Egyptian positions in the Sinai remained defensive. Eban left the White House distraught. Historian Michael Oren explains his reaction: "Eban was livid. Unconvinced that Nasser was either determined or even able to attack, he now saw Israelis inflating the Egyptian threat - and flaunting their weakness - in order to extract a pledge that the President, Congress-bound, could never make. 'An act of momentous irresponsibility... eccentric...' were his words for the cable, which, he wrote, 'lacked wisdom, veracity and tactical understanding. Nothing was right about it'." In a lecture given in 2002, Oren said, "Johnson sat around with his advisors and said, ‘What if their intelligence sources are better than ours?’ Johnson decided to fire off a Hotline message to his counterpart in the Kremlin, Alexey Kosygin, in which he said, ‘We've heard from the Israelis, but we can't corroborate it, that your proxies in the Middle East, the Egyptians, plan to launch an attack against Israel in the next 48 hours. If you don't want to start a global crisis, prevent them from doing that.’ At 2:30 a.m. on 27 May, Soviet Ambassador to Egypt Dimitri Pojidaev knocked on Nasser's door and read him a personal letter from Kosygin in which he said, ‘We don't want Egypt to be blamed for starting a war in the Middle East. If you launch that attack, we cannot support you.’ `Amer consulted his sources in the Kremlin, and they corroborated the substance of Kosygin's message. Despondent, Amer told the commander of Egypt's air force, Major General Mahmud Sidqi, that the operation was cancelled." According to then Egyptian Vice-President Hussein al Shafei as soon as Nasser knew what Amer planned he cancelled the operation.
CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The first page of the draft of the "special estimate" that predicted the outcome of the war
CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The first page of the draft of the "special estimate" that predicted the outcome of the war

On 30 May Nasser responded to Johnson's request of eleven days earlier and agreed to send his Vice President, Zakkariya Muhieddin, to Washington on 7 June to explore a diplomatic settlement in "precisely the opening the White House had sought". US Secretary of State Dean Rusk was bitterly disappointed that Israel attacked on 5 June as he thought he might have been able to find a diplomatic solution if the meeting had gone ahead. Historian Michael Oren writes that Rusk was "mad as the devils playground" and that Johnson later wrote "I have never concealed my regret that Israel decided to move when it did".

Within Israel's political leadership, it was decided that if the US would not act, and if the UN could not act, then Israel would have to act. On 1 June, Moshe Dayan was made Israeli Defense Minister, and on 3 June the Johnson administration gave an ambiguous statement; Israel continued to prepare for war. Israel's attack against Egypt on June 5 began what would later be dubbed the Six-Day War. According to Martin van Creveld the IDF pressed for war: "...the concept of 'defensible borders' was not even part of the IDFs own vocabulary. Anyone who will look for it in the military literature of the time will do so in vain. Instead, Israel's commanders based their thought on the 1948 war and, especially, their 1956 triumph over the Egyptians in which, from then Chief of Staff Dayan down, they had gained their spurs. When the 1967 crisis broke they felt certain of their ability to win a 'decisive, quick and elegant' victory, as one of their number, General Haim Bar Lev, put it, and pressed the government to start the war as soon as possible".

The combatant armies

On the eve of the war, Egypt massed around 100,000 of its 160,000 troops in the Sinai, including all of its seven divisions (four infantry, two armored and one mechanized), as well as four independent infantry and four independent armored brigades. No less than a third of them were veterans of Egypt's intervention into the Yemen Civil War and another third were reservists. These forces had 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs and more than 1,000 artillery pieces. At the same time some Egyptian troops (15,000 - 20,000) were still fighting in Yemen. Nasser's ambivalence about his goals and objectives was reflected in his orders to the military. The general staff changed the operational plan four times in May 1967, each change requiring the redeployment of troops, with the inevitable toll on both main and vehicles. Towards the end of May, Nasser finally forbade the general staff from proceeding with the Qahir ("Victory") plan, which called for a light infantry screen in the forward fortifications with the bulk of the forces held back to conduct a massive counterattack against the main Israeli advance when identified, and ordered a forward defense of the Sinai. In the meantime, he continued to take actions intended to increase the level of mobilisation of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, in order to bring pressure on Israel.

Syria's army had a total strength of 75,000. Jordan's army had 55,000 troops, including 300 tanks, 250 of which were US M48 Patton, sizable amounts of M113 APCs, a new battalion of mechanised infantry, and a paratrooper battalion trained in the new US built school. They also had 12 battalions of artillery and six batteries of 81 mm and

Pada 27-03-08 09:30 , Daeng_Jati posting:



perang vietnam perang teluk 1 dan 2 adalah bukti buku bertemu ruas.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

cerita lah....
teman nak dengo ceriter Combat ni.

Pada 27-03-08 09:44 , Daeng_Jati posting:


ok semasa perang vietnam dulu,amerika terpaksa berdepan dengan casualties yang sangat tinggi kerana berdepan dengan askar vietnam dan ditambah dengan peningkatan jumlah pesawat b52 yang ditembak jatuh.ini kerana pada masa tu vietnam ada rangkaian pertahanan yang paling kuat pernah wujud didunia dan ditambah dengan rangkaian terowong2 yang membolehkan membuat serangan mengejut di semua arah serta taktik2 yang ampuh dalam melawan amerika seperti taktik gugusan tembakan yang mana mereka tak halakan peluru berpandu ke arah pesawat tapi menunggu pesawat melintasi mereka dan serta merta melepaskan tembakan dan ni menyebabkan pesawat tak dapat melepaskan diri.di iraq pula masa tu iraq guna taktik yang sama seperti vietnam tapi kesilapan iraq adalah salah menilai kebolehan amerika yang ada pesawat stealth dan mendedahkan diri terlalu lama kepada pesawat amerika untuk memusnahkan mereka.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

Perang Gerila ni evergreen dari dulu ye....
hebat juga..

Pada 27-03-08 10:01 , Daeng_Jati posting:


see,tak ke tu buku bertemu ruas tu?


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

tu bukan buku bertemu ruas...
tu Gajah bertemu sekoloni semut...

Buku bertemu ruas, sesama kuat. kekadang boleh jadi ancaman Perang Nuklear.

Pada 27-03-08 10:13 , Daeng_Jati posting:


kalau nak macam tu,dah ada dalam perang dingin.tapi masa tu semua perang dirahsiakan


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

tak mo perang dingin, teman nak perang buku bertemu ruas....
perang berskala besor. baru tau. Perang Dunia Ketiga.

Pada 27-03-08 10:19 , Daeng_Jati posting:


apa kata anda cetuskan saya ikut saja.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

“If Iran had a nuclear weapon, it’d be a dangerous threat to world peace,� Bush said. “So I told people that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested …I take the threat of Iran with a nuclear weapon very seriously.� - George.W. Bush..

p/s

jangan lah marah teman pula. teman cuma nak tegakkan benang yang basah teman ni, walo apa jua sekali pun.


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perang gerila memang best...perlawanan yang ambik masa paling lama untuk mana-mana pertempuran....contoh yang paling dekat adalah konflik chechnya,afghan dan irag...pertempuran masih berlaku sehingga kini belum tahu bila akan berakhirnye

Pada 27-03-08 10:32 , Daeng_Jati posting:



hehehe,dialu2 kan.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

amerika cakap tak serupa bikin....dia sendiri pun ada nuklear...yang memang bertujuan untuk dijadikan sebagai senjata...lagilah, sebab nak encounter kekuatan rusia...sekarang mereka sendiri dah WMD....bukan nuklear...teknologi yang lebih maju dari nuklear..apa tu...lupa lah pulak..yang guna sistem laser tu..huish...amerika ni memang nak kena debik ni....

Pada 28-03-08 11:55 , sayatetapsaya posting:


oh,yang tu hanya digunakan untuk pertahanan saja.ia dipanggil ABL





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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

waaa....naruto-san baru saja tengok majalah 3 online episode 9 bertarikh 1 mac 2008...rupe2nya....tentera malaysia sudahpun ada helicopter canggih....iaitu AW109 AgustaWestland....diguna pakai oleh Pasukan Udara Tentera Darat (PUTD).

macho lah helicopter itu...memang naruto-san rasa bangga sangat malaysia mempunyai helicopter canggih macam itu.

diharap helicopter canggih ini dibeli tanpa ada commission kepada kroni2.











syabas tentera malaysia!!!


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http://al-ahkam.net/home/index.php

http://www.alwahy.com/

Pada 02-04-08 03:03 , naruto-san posting:


oh yang ni.ni cuma terhad saja bantuan dia.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

Pada 02-04-08 08:37 , Rashdin posting:

sesuai dengan tugasnye.....lagipun, ini unit PUTD, pasukan udara tentera darat....bukan fully TUDM...tugasnye pun membantu pasukan tentera darat dari segi logistic.

tapi daripada laporan majalah 3....helicopter AW109 ini bakal dilengkapi dengan senjata & peluru berpandu sebelum officially bertugas tahun 2010....bagi melindungi diri sendiri....kalau tak ada senjata, habislah...senang ditembak musuh.

tak mengapa....nanti lepas Pakatan Rakyat ambik alih malaysia...bolehlah malaysia beli helicopter yang lagi hebat.....maybe helicopter tiger.

p/s: tengok helicopter PUTD ini....teringat cerita airwolf......memang sebijik serupa.


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http://al-ahkam.net/home/index.php

http://www.alwahy.com/

pada saya,kiowa warrior tu lagi sesuai dan lincah beserta lagi dengan agility dan manuver yang tinggi.kos selenggara pun berpatutan dan tidak perlukan kos tambahan.

Pejuang Iraq tembak jatuh Apache guna AK-47 saja...hehe


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DUNIA INI INDAHNYA SEBELUM DI TANGAN...

Pada 29-04-08 16:02 , sailormoon posting:


perkara biasa saja dimedan perang.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

Pada 30-04-08 15:02 , Rashdin posting:

Makan mee megi di medan perang pun perkara biasa jugak...


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Kerbau adalah kerbau... Lembu adalah lembu... Kambing adalah kambing... Dan..., Aku adalah aku...

Pada 30-04-08 15:12 , mizie_hafiz80 posting:


biasalah tu,di medan memang macam tu.


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

zaman dulu ada undang-undang berperang. contohnya tak boleh tembak atau serang pembawe panji2, ketua, tukang main drum dan sebagainya...
sekarang semua tu dah tak ada dah...
sekarang semua target aset penting dan ketua. kalau penembak hendap tu, memang target ketua saja...

Pada 30-04-08 22:36 , Daeng_Jati posting:


sebab itu boleh mempengaruhi psikologi dan juga faktor kemenangan


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln

Pada 30-04-08 22:11 , Rashdin posting:


megi sangat bernilai di medan perang....
tapi Kalau dah perang, nak masuk megi pun xsempat makan

Pada 22-06-08 17:20 , ibnutuki posting:



ala,askar ada lah makanan khas untuk perang.bila habis kenalah cari sendiri


p/s--------->apa dah jadi dengan kes komando tu ek?


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"It is better to dia for something than live for nothing" - Abraham Lincoln